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This article presents new insights into Spencer’s theoretical sociology as he applied it to
the professions and professional institutions, which he discussed extensively, particularly
in his Principles of Sociology. The first part of this article notes the main conceptual
insights which he established and aligns them within the wider context of a re-reading
of Spencer’s sociology. Particular attention is paid to the “social organism” and the
spontaneous cooperation of social individuals in society (with each possessing “social
self-consciousness”). This part also reappraises Spencer’s account of the emergence of
“professionals” and their distinctive “cunning, skill, and acquaintance with the nature of
things,” which professionals have brought to bear on what has been experienced in the
ordinary social lives of people as complexity or the unfamiliar in the world. The subsequent
discussion focuses on, first, a retrieval of Spencer’s theoretical stance on the activities of
the professions, and on work and conditions in general, and, second, on reviewing some
of the major resonances which his work has with practical problems and the associated
theoretical issues concerning the sociological understanding of professional/service-user
interaction in social life today.
Keywords: Herbert Spencer, professions, service users, complexity and agile agents, social organism and
spontaneous cooperation, inheritance of acquired characteristics
INTRODUCTION
Recent studies on Spencer have produced significant insights about how to interpret his complex
ideas afresh, permitting them to be seen in a more substantial and systematically linked conceptual
context1. In an earlier article the present writer provided a general survey of what new accounts
have achieved in terms of additional theoretical coherence to the understanding of Spencer. The
present article has a different primary focus, a reassessment of his substantial body of work on
the professions and professional institutions. It has been an overlooked strength of Spencer that
he nuanced his abstract sociological thinking about aspects of social life with micro-level everyday
observation (as argued by Turner, 1985, Ch. 8). One interest which Spencer had in particular was
professionals and professional institutions.
In the interests of clarity, however, it is necessary to cover very briefly again a little of what was
covered in more detail in the earlier article, chiefly in relation to what Spencer meant by the “social
1Part of the complexity of studying Spencer as a sociologist is that important insights into understanding his sociology are
gained not only from Social Statics, the Study of Sociology and the Principles of Sociology (and many of his essays), but also
from wider framework in which his ideas were set out: First Principles, the Principles of Psychology; the Principles of Biology;
and the Principles of Ethics. On occasion there were changes of substance between first edition and later editions.
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organism” and the place in societies of the spontaneous
cooperation of social individuals, where each possessed a
sense of “social self-consciousness.” This sense of “social self-
consciousness” itself, for Spencer, was brought about by a
mechanism of change arising through social and psychological
adaptation to circumstances and the inheritance of acquired
characteristics. These are matters which will be explained in the
first main section.
Spencer’s interest in professions must have dated back at
least to his years as a young man from 1837 to 1846, when he
experienced first-hand the professional responsibilities associated
with a brand-new frontier of the art of civil engineering: for, as an
early participant in some of the first railway schemes in England
as they were constructed or projected, he was in at the birth of a
revolution in communications. The primary focus here, then, is a
reappraisal of what Spencer says on the professions, professional
institutions and work more generally (as it is situated within
his theoretical framework), and how these contributions have
implications for certain practical problems and theoretical issues
in the understanding of facets of professional life today. The
discussion deals in particular with such subjects as Spencer and
professional self-interest, his views of “justice” and professionals,
and his comments on the nature of “work” in a general sense.
The discussion also, looking back, shows how his mechanism
of individual and social change is one constituent of a cascade
of ideas that is itself related to the contemporary social science
focus on the complexity of interaction in general and between
service users and professionals in particular. This focus highlights
“agile” and knowledgeable agents, negotiating pathways through
complex landscapes of threats and opportunities, and how they
interact with professionals and others implementing policies
from social and public policy (interpreted broadly), who are of
course agents too, but now ones whose roles may have changed
quite recently to a more reactive mode. In short, the brief but
relevant and updated account of Spencer as a social theorist
dealing with the professions, which forms the first part of the
article, prefaces a reinterpretation of his account of changes in the
professions, grounded in the action of innovative agents rather
than the reified “functions” and “structures” in social life that
have often been presumed to be his principle concerns.
KEY ASPECTS OF RETRIEVING SPENCER
In previous publications (2010, 2019), I have discussed the
reasons why it is not very useful in turn to describe Spencer
as a social Darwinist, to regard his general developmental
theory of change (which he called a theory of evolution and
which including individual and social human life) as having a
central role in understanding how he interpreted substantive
matters such as “professional institutions,” and to accuse him
of “atomic individualism”2. It can be more rewarding to give
prominence to other features. The present discussion is largely
concerned with aspects of social life in what he called “industrial”
societies, since these were the societies on which Spencer mostly
2McCann (2004, p. 125–26) is also a key source arguing against seeing Spencer as
a individual atomist.
concentrated in writing on professional life. Spencer contrasted
“militant” with “industrial” structures. Militant structures are
geared for aggression, with strong central and coercive control
of the individuals in a society. Industrial structures, however,
are geared for peace, so “industrial societies” (societies in which
industrial structures predominate), have been described as having
a “spontaneously generated a loosely coupled mode of societal
organization” (Dingwall and King, 1995, p. 20, now also reprinted
in Dingwall, 2016; see too Dingwall, 2004, p. 8–9). In such
societies, social controls are “decentered,” that is to say the
controls operate at an everyday level, being concerned with
interchanges between private individuals in pursuit of private
or mutually-agreed ends, not with a direction from the center
of such interchanges toward collective purposes. In this way,
boundaries between whole societies and their environments, and
hierarchies established between their various constituent social
elements or groupings can possess a porous quality3.
This article begins by unpacking the key statement that
Spencer’s industrial form of society has “spontaneously generated
a loosely coupled mode of societal organization.” Sociologists still
connect the idea of the social organism with Spencer. Although
he used the expression in 1843 in his Letters collected as The
Proper Sphere of Government, and in Social Statics (Spencer,
1851), it was “The Social Organism” (Spencer, 1860) that clarified
what it meant to him. The essay was often later used by Spencer as
a reference point to elucidate the meaning of “society”4. At that
time the enormous variety of forms which biological organisms
exhibited in the world, including “compound individuality,” was
exciting scientific interest, which Spencer followed. The burning
question was how could a society be envisaged in this highly
charged context? In a broad but real sense a society had to be
part of “nature” (it was not after all “supernatural”)5.
Neither any particular society nor societies in general was
assimilated to any one known individual organism or set of
organisms. In every edition of his Principles of Sociology, Spencer
declared that ‘(t)he social organism, is not comparable to
any particular type of individual organism, animal or vegetal
(Spencer, 1876, p. 613, in the 3rd edition, Vol. 1, 1893, p.
580). There was a material difference peculiar to the “social
organism”: “while in the body of an animal only a special
tissue is endowed with feeling, in a society all the members
are endowed with feeling” (Spencer, 1860, p. 276). This was a
pivotal feature of social life in Spencer’s conception of a society
as organism, for, if in individual bodies, “the welfare of all other
parts is rightly subservient to the welfare of the nervous system,
whose pleasurable or painful activities make up the good or ill
of life; in bodies-politic the same thing does not hold.” In a
political body- a society- where all members have consciousness,
corporate life “must therefore serve the lives of the parts”
(Spencer, 1860, p. 276–277). The idea of the social organism
3For Spencer, late Victorian Britain strictly counted as semi-militant, semi-
industrial (Offer, 2019).
4It has important links to his essay of 1857 (Spencer, 1857), “The ultimate laws of
physiology” (re-published in his Essays as “Transcendental physiology”).
5Some parts of the discussion in this section are dealt with more extensively in
(Offer, 2015).
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was “accompanied by transcendent differences” when compared
with individual organisms, since a society was an “aggregate of
individuals distributed over a wide area” (Spencer, 1871, p. 411).
In the process, Spencer grasped that his understanding of the
social organism was entirely different to Comte’s holistic version
(Spencer, 1904, p. ii, 465)6.
Spencer recognized the connected point that the members
were mobile, or “locomotive” (Peel, 1971, p. 178). How
to understand “structure” in societies has always exercised
sociologists, but since the neglect of Spencer is widespread it
is unsurprising that he was overlooked as a predecessor in
Elder-Vass’s account of the causal powers of structures in social
life. The mechanisms which produce the causal powers on the
part of some social structures, says Elder-Vass, do not depend
“on spatially specific physical relations between their parts.”
These structures are what Elder-Vass describes as “spatially
disarticulated” (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 200). In fact, however, the
rudiments of this feature which is germane to “intersectionality”
were already well-understood by Spencer; its relevance to social
analysis today is a topic to be addressed later.
For Spencer, the “units” (individuals) in society become
subject to “actions and reaction between the community and
each member of it, such that either affects the other in nature”
(Spencer, 1893, p. 11). Individuals adapt to each other and to the
society over time, and to external conditions, and the changes
made in turn lead to further adaptations, helical in nature.
The characteristics acquired are inherited by future generations,
according to his theory of evolution, thus forming the heart of the
changes involved in “social evolution.” “Character” (or “human
nature”) is not fixed but is modified as it adjusts to surrounding
conditions. His primary mechanism of organic and social change
was pre-Darwinian and consciously derived from Jean-Baptiste
Lamarck’s idea of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, or
functionally produced changes. Darwin had not ruled out entirely
this mechanism, but his evidence for what he referred to as
“natural selection” to account for species change, what would
later be interpreted as the successful survival of genetic variations
in an environmental struggle for existence, was in the process of
eclipsing it following the publication in 1859 of On the Origin
of Species. Although Spencer did accept a place for Darwin’s
natural selection, in 1886, however, he was moved to write
in defense of the continued salience his mechanism, especially
in individual and social life: “if we admit the inheritance of
6The exact nature of Spencer’s understanding is also underlined by (Taylor,
2007). On this specific matter I think Durkheim understood Spencer’s position.
However, on some othermatters Durkheimmisunderstood Spencer’s own thought.
Durkheim was incorrect when he described Spencer’s sociology as displaying (as
Durkheim himself wrote), a “narrow utilitarianism and utilitarian egoism,” and
“moral poverty,” giving as a reason for his statement that “it is only too clear
that all social life would be impossible if there did not exist interests superior
to the interests of individuals” (in Lukes, 1969, p. 20). Spencer’s important idea
of individual “social self-consciousness” is introduced later in this Section of my
article. By contrast, Gabriel Tarde strongly criticized Durkheim’s view there is
a constraint that is “normal” associated with “reflection which causes man to
understand how much richer or more complex and permanent the social being is
than the individual being” (Durkheim, 2013, p. 98), but misunderstood the precise
and novel delineation of what Spencer meant by the “social organism” (see Tarde,
1898, p. 78–79, “Sociology,” in Clarke, 1969).
functionally-produced changes, we are justified in concluding
that this inheritance of functionally-produced changes has been
not simply a co-operating factor in organic evolution, but has
been a co-operating factor without which organic evolution, in its
higher forms at any rate, could never have taken place”(Spencer,
1886, p. 424)7.
It is not in fact a surprising matter that in our participation in
ordinary social life we showed capacities to change, to react and
act with knowledge and innovation, not least through the form
of professional activity, as will be discussed later. If Spencer had
written earlier that a progress in social life was “logically certain,”
as he did in Social Statics (Spencer, 1851, p. 64), by the Principles
of Sociology he had forsaken that belief, as will be shown in the
next Section. What was and in a measure remains a stumbling
block, however, is the idea that the accumulation of these changes
should in biological terms be inherited8.
According to Spencer, a society grows through economic and
other acts of spontaneous cooperation by gregarious and social
individuals, who are themselves displaying what is called a “social
self-consciousness” (Spencer, 1859, p. 140–141; Spencer, 1873, p.
291. See too Peel, 1971, p. 217)9. In his Principles of Psychology
Spencer portrays the possession of social self-consciousness as an
awareness that the well-being of each person is “bound up with
the well-being of all,” resulting in turn in the “growth of feelings
which find satisfaction in the well-being of all” (Spencer, 1872, ii,
p. 609). In societies in which “industrial” and thus peaceful social
relations predominate, the principal job of the community itself
through the government is to protect the equal freedom of all
citizens in order to be able to adapt to circumstances. As a society
coheres through spontaneous cooperation, and as a division of
labor emerges, it starts to exhibit a relatively stable set of functions
and allied structures. Functions and structures are mutable, they
are malleable according to the changing and varied contents of
what the spontaneous cooperations of individuals are in practice
attempting to create. Compared with an individual organism, the
structures and functions “of the social organism are obviously
7The complex and nuanced way, mostly overlooked, in which Spencer sought
to accommodate Darwin’s evolutionary mechanism of “natural selection” (to his
own satisfaction, and with a “modification”) into his much more general, all-
embracing theory of evolution in the Principles of Biology is documented in Offer
(2014). The inheritance of acquired characteristics is described as the mechanism
of “direct equilibration,” and what Spencer calls “natural selection” is described as
“indirect equilibration.”
8Note that Meloni, a social theorist working on the historical, conceptual, and
political implications of aspects of the life sciences, has remarked that “in the
surprisingly brief period since 2000 we have witnessed an impressive rehabilitation
of ideas that only three decades ago we would find bizarre or unacceptable:
basically, that there might be more than DNA transmission in biological heredity”
(Meloni, 2018, p. 138). See too Gissis (2005), on the running together or
inoculation of biological heredity and cultural inheritance in Spencer’s Principles
of Psychology.
9InDurkheim’s criticisms of Spencer’s understanding on “society” and “individual”
I have found no evidence that he was aware of the significance of Spencer’s concept
of “social self-consciousness.” In Spencer’s world, once there is a self-consciousness
of others the space for collective life is created. In terms of Bird’s analysis of
liberal individualism, Spencer’s introduction of the idea of social self-consciousness
should help to free him from accusations of “atomic” individualism (Bird, 1999, p.
206, 208). This was the misplaced nub of Durkheim’s critique of Spencer on the
foundations of “society” (Offer, 2019).
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far less specific, far more modifiable, far more dependent on
conditions that are variable and never twice alike” (Spencer, 1873,
p. 58)10.
By 1860, then, groundwork behind Spencer’s conception of
the “social organism” had yielded a strong, interlaced set of
arguments, not always credited by critics, then and now. A society
was an organism, but one with singular characteristics. This
reading of Spencer on the “social organism” shines light on the
cohesiveness of his thought on “the social,” and on the nature of
sociology too (there was no “rule” which stated that an organism
must be seen as a single collectivity). Societies were “organisms,”
a constituent of the natural world, but sui generis in their units,
structures and functions. For Spencer people and societies find
“ways of cooperating with each other” and that they initiate
jointly by developing “new ideas and practices” (Dingwall and
King, 1995, p. 16), an outcome which follows logically from the
fundamental and original features of his thought.
“PROFESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS” IN
SPENCER’S PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY
Acts of spontaneous cooperation between social individuals
can be regarded partly as an adaptive response to what they
experienced as complexity or the unfamiliar in the world being
encountered. Viewed in this way, Spencer was in the forefront as
a sociologist who was confronting the challenge to understand
social life as involving people who were making sense of and
negotiating ways through complex landscapes, although as it
happens he has been largely unrecognized as such11. Despite
the observations of the previous section, it remains possible
that reservations might still be raised on the legitimacy of
presenting Spencer in this way, or that the themes in question
are to be strongly associated with Spencer. A likely source is
the influence of a still commonly-held view that Spencer is
definitively associated with a theory of evolution in general
and social evolution in particular that is directional and lineal
in nature. For if true, Spencer could lack the salience to
contemporary sociological concerns being implied. However,
Spencer himself clarified his position. Immediately after his most
detailed remarks on professions in his Principles of Sociology
were written, he went on, in the same volume, to disown with
conviction that the alleged position on evolution was one he
occupied. About evolution in general and social evolution in
particular, he stated: “Evolution does not imply a latent tendency
to improve, everywhere in operation. There is no uniform
tendency from lower to higher, but only an occasional production
10Yet note too that Spencer denied free-will in the Principles of Psychology, in all
editions of the book (Offer, 2006, p. 60).
11In his The Study of Sociology, written to persuade skeptics of the need for the
subject, Spencer referred to the “extremely-complex phenomena which Sociology
deals with” which demands a complex intellectual faculty having the “plasticity that
can receive with ease” the “countless combinations of social phenomena” (1873,
p. 145). Using the example of then the new automatic Walter Press, employed
for printing the Times, Spencer paints a picture of the myriad and non-linear
social events and processes which were drawn together to make its invention
possible. The phenomena which made it possible were complex, “but there is
mostly an absolute unconsciousness that there are any such complex phenomena
to be grasped” (1873, p. 132).
of a form which, in virtue of greater fitness for more complex
conditions, becomes capable of a longer life of a more varied
kind” (Spencer, 1896, p. 599).
With that reminder now in place, this article moves on to show
that Spencer’s focus, on understanding social life as involving
social individuals confronting challenging and complex terrains,
shapes his work on the actions of professionals and professional
institutions in particular. In the event, it is worth noting that
this discussion is also providing a rare opportunity to revisit at
least a part of the substantive aspects of his sociology. Spencer
observed in his general introduction to professions, that the mark
of the modern professionals’ strength draws on a legacy from
the “cunning, skill, and acquaintance with the nature of things”
which gave “the primitive priest or medicine-man influence over
his fellows.” That kind of entrepreneurial power, says Spencer, “is
augmented by those feats and products which exceed the ability
of the people to achieve or understand; and he is therefore under
a constant stimulus to acquire the superior culture and themental
powers needed for those activities which we class as professional”
(Spencer, 1896, p. 184).
Spencer’s own main references to professions, as has been
noted, occur in his chief sociological book the Principles
of Sociology, which contained a landmark discussion of
“Professional Institutions” (in Volume 3, of 1896). Since the
first volume first appeared in 1876 and the second volume
in 1882, “Professional Institutions” was late in the sequence
of the component Parts, and late in Spencer’s own life. Only
the “Industrial Institutions” Part was to follow, completing the
third and final volume. The previous Parts were the “Data”
of sociology (on early man), the “Inductions” of sociology
(including “society” as an entity), followed by “Domestic
Institutions” and “Ceremonial Institutions,” in turn leading to
“Political Institutions” and “Ecclesiastical Institutions,” in both of
which Spencer argued were the origins of the professions.
In “Professional Institutions,” Spencer discussed the
development and secularization of professions, as well as
individual professions, dealing with Physician and Surgeon;
Dancer and Musician; Orator and Poet; Actor and Dramatist;
Biographer, Historian, and Man of Letters; Scientist and
Philosopher; Judge and Lawyer; Teacher; Architect; Sculptor;
and Painter.
Professions emerge by being differentiated over time from the
general regulation of social life sustained and managed by the
“politico-ecclesiastical” agency:
No group of institutions illustrates with greater clearness the
process of social evolution; and none shows more undeniably
how social evolution conforms to the law of evolution at large.
The germs out of which the professional agencies arise, forming
at first a part of the regulative agency, differentiate from it at
the same time that they differentiate from one another; and,
while severally being rendered more multiform by the rise of
subdivisions, severally become more coherent within themselves
and more definitely marked off (1896, p. 311).
Spencer’s conception of the functions of professional institutions
accords with his general conception of the relationship between a
society and its members: the maintenance of the life of a society,
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an “insentient organism,” is considered “only as a means to the
ultimate end—maintenance of the lives of its members, which are
sentient organisms” (Spencer, 1896, p. 179).
Spencer views a society as not a “manufacture” but a growth,
and this includes the development of the professions. Social
arrangements come about not by changes “contemplated by
rulers” (Spencer, 1896, p. 315), not by design, but by changes
attributable to “the unprompted workings of this organized
humanity” (Spencer, 1896, p. 317):
So unconscious are men of the life of the social organism
that though the spontaneous actions of its units, each seeking
livelihood, generate streams of food which touch at their doors
every hour—though the water for the morning bath, the lights
for their rooms, the fires in their grates, the bus or tram which
takes them to the City, the business they carry on (made possible
by the distributing system they share in), the evening “Special”
they glance at, the theater or concert to which they presently go,
and the cab home, all result from the unprompted workings of
this organized humanity, they remain blind. Though by its vital
activities capital is drafted to places where it is most wanted,
supplies of commodities balanced in every locality and prices
universally adjusted—all without official supervision; yet, being
oblivious of the truth that these processes are socially originated
without design of anyone, they cannot believe that society will be
bettered by natural agencies. And hence when they see an evil to
be cured or a good to be achieved, they ask for legal coercion as
the only possible means (Spencer, 1896: 316-17).
There is an echo here of the economist Richard Whately, whom
Spencer had earlier in time often cited, who had written similarly
in his Introductory Lectures on Political Economy (Whately,
1832) and had depicted economic exchange as “catallactics.”
For Spencer, governments are blind to social life as “catallaxy”
(though this is not a word adopted by him)12. Through the
passage of time, occupations have become so specialized that the
labor of each person, satisfying some needs of others, has had
their own needs satisfied by the work of hundreds of others.
Here, then, is a reiteration of “spontaneous cooperation” as a
cornerstone of the “social organism,” and thus of society itself,
and the sub-text of professional life.
Given the breadth of activities covered in Professional
Institutions, only a few examples of Spencer’s comments can
be chosen. He commonly illustrates “differentiation” growing
up within professions (thus there are, for example, musical
performers, professors and teachers of music, and holders
of examination passes and of degrees in music; and also
differentiation between the many local musical societies and
the music colleges, “with their students, professorial staffs, and
directors” (Spencer, 1896, p. 214). He illustrates “integration” as
achieved though “a periodical literature,” in the case of music,
journals “devoted to reports and criticism of concerts, operas,
oratorios, and serving to . . . maintain the interest of the teachers
and performers” (Spencer, 1896, p. 214).
12There is no firm evidence that Freidrich Hayek was influenced by Spencer but
there is some likeness (Smith, 1981, 2013, p. 203; McCann, 2004). In his “Sociology
and neoliberalism: a missing history,” however, Gane makes no mention of how
Hayek has similarities with Spencer on spontaneous cooperation, and on altruism
(Gane, 2014, p. 1101).
In the discussion of Science as a profession Spencer naturally
introduces the growth of specializations within subject areas
such as biology, but it is noteworthy that in Philosophy he
made no mention of “friction” between different “schools”
of thought. Spencer occupied a position which embraced
utilitarianism and an orientation toward social science, whereas
by the 1880s Idealist modes of philosophical thought about
how to discover fundamental values and knowledge were
in the ascendant in Britain, concerned to question those
very developments as heralds of a dehumanizing materialism.
These years were witnessing acute differences over fundamental
principles between Spencer and Idealists such as T H Green,
Bernard Bosanquet, Henry Jones, David George Ritchie (and
“New Liberals” in the Liberal Party as well). The key differences
were over how best to achieve social reform, the responsibilities
of the state and the meaning of concepts such as “the good”
and “positive freedom.” The distinctive manner in which Spencer
had delineated the social organism and emphasized cooperation
and “social self-consciousness,” a self-consciousness in each
citizen “of the state of the aggregate of citizens” (Peel, 1971,
p. 2017), tended to be side-lined or misrepresented in favor of
“society” conceived as a holistic “moral organism.” For Ritchie,
for example, Spencer’s individual was depicted in a skewed
and exaggerated way, “as if he had a meaning and significance
apart from his surroundings and apart from his relations to the
community of which he is a member” (Ritchie, 1885, p. 646, also
in Offer, 2000, Vol. 4, p. 106).
In Professional Institutions, Spencer eschewed making
any remark that this trend toward Idealist philosophy was
tantamount to harking back to the orthodoxies associated with
militant and coercive social relations13. Perhaps he judged
that a concise developmental account of professions in general
was an inappropriate place to display personal philosophical
divergences, even if they were profound.
Spencer viewed professional specialization as adaptive for
individuals and societies. It encouraged them to prosper and
allowed a more competitive edge because, as Dingwall and King
remarked, “of the way in which it introduced more flexibility,
more cooperation, andmore space for innovation” (Dingwall and
King, 1995, p. 16). Spencer had emphasized more the creative
role of the professions “than domost modern analysts” (Dingwall
and King, 1995, p. 19). For Everett Hughes, Spencer regarded the
“elaboration” of the roles of professions as “the essential feature of
civilized society” (Hughes, 1960, p. 54). Such accounts correctly
conclude that Spencer understood professionals in industrial
societies as market actors, acknowledging that they enhance the
quality of life by having services to offer which are innovative and
substantive. This viewpoint, Dingwall and King observe, “is an
important corrective to some of the nihilism of the sociology of
the professions in the 1960s and 1970s, when it often seemed that
professions were merely... auxiliary organs of capitalist power”
(Dingwall and King, 1995, p. 19).
Relationships between the professions and the state were of
constant interest to Spencer. This dimension also appealed to
Dingwall and King who concluded that a virtue of Spencer’s
focus was to open the way “to a more convincing analysis of
13As he was to record in his correspondence in 1902. See (Duncan, 1908), p. 457–8.
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the relations between the state and the professions” (Dingwall
and King, 1995, p. 21), as compared to Abbott (1988),
who concentrated on relationships between professionals (these
themes are developed in the later sixth Section “Spencer,
professionals and their users.” Dingwall and King stretch
credibility, though, when describing Spencer as delivering a
“paean for laissez-faire” (Dingwall and King, 1995, p. 22), thus
disregarding his rebuttals of the expression as applied to him,
made in a rejoinder to T H Huxley in Spencer’s “Specialized
administration” of 1871 (Spencer, 1871, p. 438), and, quoted here,
in 1893 in “Evolutionary Ethics” (Spencer, 1897, p. 115).
I am not aware that anyone has more emphatically asserted that
society in its corporate capacity must exercise a rigorous control
over its individual members, to the extent needful for preventing
trespasses one upon another. No one has more frequently or
strongly denounced governments for the laxity with which they
fulfill this duty. So far from being, as some have alleged, an
advocacy of the claims of the strong against the weak, it is
much more an insistence that the weak shall be guarded against
the strong, so that they may suffer no greater evils than their
relative weakness itself involves. And no one hasmore vehemently
condemned that “miserable laissez-faire which calmly looks on
while men ruin themselves in trying to enforce by law their
equitable claims (Ethics, § 271).”
Dealing with the protection of the liberty of all in social
relationships providing that none should infringe the like liberty
of another is the proper sphere of government. To work to
ensure “justice” in this sense is for Spencer an expectation placed
upon the conduct of professionals and professional institutions
(Mingardi, 2015). This liberal conception of “justice,” which
Spencer consistently held as a writer on social matters, limited
the role of government in peaceful, “industrial” states, to the
protection of the equal liberty principle. Spencer should have
written more systematically about forms of power in “industrial”
social life but he did recognize them, and his awareness led
him to a specific inference about how face-to-face interactions
between a range of professions and citizens should be conducted.
In addition to the state’s responsibility to protect a citizen’s
person “and punish criminal aggression on him,” there is the
responsibility “to administer civil justice to the citizen free of
cost” (Spencer, 1891, p. 660–61). Given that legislators raise
taxes from us, Spencer asks rhetorically whether the government
takes up the cause of the poor man to defend him “against the
aggressions of his rich neighbor.” In its failure to defray this
cost of maintaining civil order it commits the sin of omission.
Government abandons the complainant “to the tender mercies of
solicitors, attorneys, barristers, and a whole legion of law officers”
(Spencer, 1843, in Offer, 1994, pp. 3–57, p. 51). In his later
Principles of Ethics Spencer renewed the complaint. The State
may guard citizens “against offenders classed as criminals,” but
if a citizen “is defrauded of an estate” it “turns deaf ears to his
complaint, and leaves him either to bear the loss, or run the
risk of further and perhaps greater loss in carrying on a suit
and possibly appeals” (Spencer, 1910, vol. 2, p. 210). Had the
penalties been clear and certain at the outset, the majority of civil
offenses “would never have been committed” (Spencer, 1910, vol.
2, p. 211).
Spencer had identified a serious hindrance in the way of
permitting ready access to sound and practical professional
advice and guidance for ordinary citizens at the point of need.
He understood that his concept of “justice,” a pivotal component
of the conditions required for the conduct of social life, made it
imperative that the chances should be maximized for citizens to
have available, promptly and freely, the services of the “family”
of professional skills in the area of the law, thus enabling cases of
injustice to be replaced by justice as a matter of urgency.
PROFESSIONS AND SELF-INTERESTS
“Professional Institutions” does not exhaust what Spencer said
on professions. Whether in his early The Proper Sphere of
Government (Spencer, 1843) or the later The Man versus The
State (Spencer, 1884, in Offer, 1994, pp. 61–175), a recurrent
target was the “interested motives” by “certain medical men” to
advocate “enactments for the preservation of the public health,”
irrespective of need (Spencer, 1843, p. 56)14. In Social Statics, the
critique embraced a comparison between medics and the clergy:
the fear that unauthorized preachers could spread false doctrines
“has its analog in the fear that unauthorized practitioners may
give deleterious medicines or advice... (t)here is an evident
inclination on the part of the medical profession to get itself
organized after the fashion of the clericy” (Spencer, 1851, p.
375). Nervousness about Messianic tendencies reappeared in
Professional Institutions: “the priesthood of medicine persecutes
heretics and those who are without diplomas. There has
long been, and still continues, denunciations of unlicensed
practitioners, as also of the “counter-practice” carried on by
apothecaries . . . . a constant tendency to a more definite marking
off of the integrated professional body” (Spencer, 1896, p.
199). Perhaps with the best of intentions, myopic professionals
desired compulsory legislation, depriving individuals of their
liberty and encouraging dependence on the state, at the price
of slowing the process of social evolution by which individuals
(and by inheritance their offspring) can progressively adapt to
their circumstances. Against this compulsory enlightenment the
antidote was what Spencer called “a systematic study of natural
causation as displayed among human beings socially aggregated”
(Spencer, 1884, p. 123. See too Spencer, 1873, p. 66–7, 81–2).
Spencer had interpreted ecclesiastical institutions as one of the
original sources of later, largely secular professionals. An earlier
section of the Sociology had discussed the prospects for churches
and priests. He interpreted religious beliefs and practices as
in general long-term decline, with the future of “Ecclesiastical
Institutions” involving churches and priests transitioning from
the calling of dogmatic theology to offering counsel and advice in
more nuanced tones. In an evolving world standards of morality
were a relative matter: “The ideas of right and wrong, now
regarded as applying only to actions of certain kinds, will be
regarded as having applications coextensive with actions of every
14See also Spencer’s essay “The morals of trade,” in which there are examples of the
misdemeanors of solicitors and barristers (Spencer, 1859, p. 139).
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kind. All matters concerning individual and social welfare will
come to be dealt with, and a chief function of one who stands
in place of a minister, will be not so much that of emphasizing
precepts already accepted, as that of developing men’s judgments
and sentiments in relation to those more difficult questions of
conduct arising from the ever-increasing complexity of social
life” (Spencer, 1896, p. 157–58)15. In this case, of course, self-
interest might indicate joining a profession such as social work.
Spencer seems to have not considered any case of professions
or of professional institutions in decline beyond those associated
with religious observation (for a recent study of the decline of the
profession of actuary see Collins et al., 2009).
SPENCER AND THE WIDER WORLD OF
WORK
Aspects of work and employment which impinge on professional
activities, in particular the trades unions, working conditions
in general and unpaid work, attracted Spencer’s attention. His
critical comments derive from his equal freedom principle
(justice). Trades unions can resort to coercion to demand
obedience from their members and obstruct piece-work practices
(Spencer, 1910, ii, p. 279–281; Offer, 2010), and in their name
strikers had resorted to violence and hence injustice against
employers (Spencer, 1910, ii, p. 294–96). However, justice is
also a weapon on the side of unions. “Judging from their harsh
and cruel conduct in the past,” Spencer writes, “it is tolerable
certain that employers are now prevented from doing unfair
things which they would else do” (Spencer, 1896, p. 542). Clearly
pertaining to wages and health at work, these are remarks
seldom credited to Spencer: Wiltshire, for example, accused
him of “inveterate hostility” to trade unions (Wiltshire, 1978, p.
141; 161).
On some general working conditions Spencer’s condemnation
is unequivocal (as Peel noted, 1971, p. 216). The advances in
machinery in factories “has proved extremely detrimental” in
mental and physical respects for the health of the operatives
(Spencer, 1896, p. 515). The wage-earning mill worker may
exemplify free labor, but “this liberty amounts in practice to little
more than the ability to exchange one slavery for another” . . . ..
“The coercion of circumstances often bears more hardly on him
than the coercion of a master does on one in bondage” (Spencer,
1896, p. 516. Spencer’s misgivings about wage labor and injustice,
and his support for trade unionism, receive further discussion in
Weinstein, 1998, p. 201–207).
Spencer was well-aware that, in ordinary social interaction,
there was much activity showing the “fellow feeling” which was
integral to social life, as opposed to the perspective of “atomic
individualism” of which, as has been noted earlier, some critics
have charged him:
Always each may continue to further the welfare of others by
warding off from them evils they cannot see, and by aiding
their actions in ways unknown to them; or, conversely putting
15On Spencer’s contrast between “absolute” and “relative” ethics see Taylor (2007),
p. 116–123.
it, each may have, as it were, supplementary eyes and ears in
other persons, which perceive for him things he cannot perceive
himself: so perfecting his life in numerous details, by making its
adjustments to environing actions complete (Spencer, 1910, p.
i, 254).
Moreover, he captured for his readers in some sympathetic
detail the intricate dynamics of “private beneficence,” or informal
care, arising when families or neighbors undertake to tend
or nurse ill or frail family members or acquaintances. Private
beneficence had moral qualities that made it preferable to state
beneficence, but he was disquieted by the disproportionate
burdens of care which were performed by women and the
restricted opportunities which followed in its wake (on Spencer
on this aspect see Offer, 1999). Spencer’s comments on unpaid
work pivot around “beneficence” in the Principles of Ethics.
Beneficence is altruism over and above the demands of “justice.”
Spencer’s concern with “beneficence” as against “justice” and
its demands here signified that he was continuing a tradition
familiar from The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith16.
Voluntariness in the shape of voluntary organizations
conformed to Spencer’s ideas about social development. He
welcomed the organized but spontaneous voluntary action (the
“provident beneficence”) which was forthcoming when ordinary
persons, who had acquired surgical and medical knowledge,
stepped in to provide help to sufferers before the arrival of
professional help (Spencer, 1910, ii, p. 361). Hiskes (1983) traces
the treatment of Spencer’s idea of social individuals and his liberal
idea of community since his day, criticizing some libertarian
sources, including Robert Nozich’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia
(1974), for ignoring the altruistic attitudes and motivations of
people in social life which Spencer had described in detail. In
addition, Spencer’s familiarity with The History of Cooperation in
England of 1875 by G J Holyoake and The Cooperative Movement
in Great Britain of 1891 by Beatrice Potter made him amiably
disposed toward organized cooperative ventures in production:
we were witnessing the “germ of a spreading organization” (1896,
p. 564)17.
16Smith’s own concern was noted by the botanist, lawyer and writer, Bicheno
(1824, p. 150), who distinguished “beneficence” from “benevolence”: benevolence
“may signify either the principle, or that intuitive instinct or impulse which
excites in us sympathy toward the distressed, and a desire to relieve and
communicate happiness; or, it may signify the exercise of the principle in the actual
communication of happiness. This, in order to distinguish it from the former,
has been frequently called beneficence” (1824, p. 78). Bicheno was important as
a champion of voluntary beneficence and critical of statutory poor law provision,
particularly in Ireland (McGauran and Offer, 2017).
17Spencer and Holyoake were contemporaries and on friendly terms. Spencer
was close to the Potter family, encouraged Beatrice’s interest in social science,
and figured in her autobiographical My Apprenticeship, (Webb, 1926) and Our
Partnership, (Webb, 1948). She married Sidney Webb in 1892, but despite her
Fabian socialism and particular enthusiasm for the work of health professionals
she and Spencer remained on good terms. Since it also cuts across some
preconceptions of Spencer, note that he personally intervened to try to secure
Williams and Norgate as publisher (in the event successfully) for Booth’s Life and
Labor of the People. In a letter to Williams (Jan. 4 1889) wrote: “This letter will
be handed to you by my friend Mr Charles Booth, whose name you have probably
seen in the newspapers in connection with statistics of labor in the East-end. He has
I know bestowed much trouble in giving a true account of a very involved matter,
and his results are recognized and quoted as authoritative.
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Any discussion of Spencer and the wider world of work has
to consider at least briefly Spencer’s reference to a “third” type of
society beyond his distinction between “militant” and industrial’
types of societies. In the first and subsequent editions of the first
volume of the Principle of Sociology (Spencer, 1876) he predicted
that when the industrial form was more fully developed, societies
will use the results not exclusively for material aggrandizement,
but for carrying on “higher activities” as well. The new type is
indicated by “inversion of the belief that life is for work into the
belief that work is for life” (Spencer, 1893, p. 563). The changes to
be expected are “the multiplication of institutions and appliances
for intellectual and aesthetic culture” (Spencer, 1893, p. 563). In
1882, the third type became the theme of his speech delivered
in New York, warning his audience of the barrenness of an
obsession with work (Spencer, 1904; Shapin, 2007; Werth, 2009,
ii, p. 387–409). Again, it is significant that Spencer frowned on
laissez-faire without boundaries.
SPENCER, PROFESSIONALS, AND THEIR
USERS
Spencer identified professions by their role or function in social
life in his own evolutionary-based narrative (his distinctive,
non-Darwinian, theory of evolution). The professions had an
innovative power in social life: once “the defense of life, the
regulation of life and the sustentation of life” have been achieved,
then the professions in general foster the “augmentation of
life” (Spencer, 1896, p. 181). It is interesting that in a new
research Tracey Adams, studying professional self-regulation in
Canada, points explicitly to Spencer’s importance as an analysist
of professions, underlining his emphasis on the special insight
or “expertise” of professionals, particularly in their “institutional
roles” (Adams, 2018, p. 29). As was noted earlier, Spencer had
singled out professions for their honed “acquaintance with the
nature of things” (Spencer, 1896, p. 184).
Some important points arise around his emphasis on the idea
of adaptation to circumstances by individuals and societies. As
has been discussed already, the key mechanism of change in
the organic world in general for Spencer is the inheritance of
acquired characteristics following adaptation to circumstances,
and by social individuals in particular (and thus on to the
communities which they form). Dingwall and King noted that
Spencer “is not thinking simply of the material or biological
environment, but of selection pressure from other individuals
or societies” (Dingwall and King, 1995, p. 16). Thus the scene
is set in which the potential dynamism, but also precariousness,
of the nature of the professional/service-user interface becomes a
central topic.
As indicated earlier, Dingwall and King discussed Abbott’s
application of an ecological perspective to the understanding
of “the processes by which boundaries are drawn and redrawn
between the elements in an ecological system,” and to the
He wishes to give a permanent form to these results, and proposes to negotiate
with you as publisher. I shall be glad to hear that you have come to a satisfactory
arrangement” (Letter to Spencer to Williams, Knox College Illinois, Bookfellow
Foundation Collection).
sequencing of the development of professions. By contrast, they
argue, Spencer has as a main interest interchanges “both between
the system elements and across the boundary that distinguishes
the system from its environment” (Dingwall and King, 1995,
p. 21): the flaw in Abbott’s methodological approach as against
Spencer’s was that it seemed to exclude the growth of the various
layers of state/professions relationships.
Since 1995 and the Dingwall and King publication, Abbott’s
work drawing on ecology has been enlarged upon in approaches
invoking co-evolution and complex adaptation, as described
and explained in, for example, Room’s Complexity, Institutions
and Public Policy: Agile Decision-Making in a Turbulent World
(Room, 2011). Other recent work covering the quintessential
Spencerian theme of professionals, change, and complexity
has been explored fruitfully by the French sociologist Florent
Champy (although in this case as far as I am aware without
making a specific connection to Spencer). In commenting on
studies of professionals, he notes “professionals are sometimes
confronted with a level of complexity that brings some
irreducible uncertainty in their work. It is impossible to know
with scientific certainty what should be done and what exactly
would result from any action once completed. Working with
people (e.g., in medical practice, social work, teaching) is
emblematic of this type of difficulty” (2018, p. 1). However,
Champy goes on to suggest that “theorizing complexity and
its effects on professional work has never been a priority for
the sociology of professions.” He adds that sociology has paid
“little attention” to how professionals “manage to accomplish
their work, the concrete difficulties they encounter or their
dissatisfaction concerning the outcome of their work” (2018,
p. 1).
In this context Room (2016), while referring to a later
publication than was available to Dingwall and King by Abbott
(2001, ch. 5), hints at a less constrained interpretation of Abbott’s
work than they held. Given the concerns of the present article,
Room’s ideas in particular need further discussion. To be clear,
it is no longer the case that professions are in a bounded
system, simply in a struggle between each other (if ever that
were the case) for the openings in which their members can
earn their crusts, but that there is “open access” to information
for all, which risks redundancy for all; a new “survival of
the fittest,” to use Spencer’s own coinage18. In “uncertain and
foggy landscapes” (or environments), the relationships with the
state which pertain for professionals need to as much figure
in “adaptive walks” as with their relationships to other active
agents, including individuals, families and communities. All
these social actors are likely to be seeking positional advantage
(Room, 2016, p. 100–101). The basic premise is that we live in a
world of increasingly agile and informed choice-making agents
18Spencer first used the expression, as a tailored alternative to Darwin’s “natural
selection” in the Origin of Species of 1859, in his first volume of his Principles of
Biology of 1864. However, to be clear here, Room stresses that “it is not sufficient to
treat such selection mechanisms as “blind forms of “self-organization”. Powerful
actors struggle purposefully to organize and reshape these processes and the
direction of technological and institutional change, so as to reinforce and defend
their own positional advantage. Here there is an endless dance” (Room, 2016,
p. 104).
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[“queens” in Le Grand’s (2006) terminology] who are potential
users or non-users of a range of services from policy-makers
and professionals. Policy-makers and professionals, with any
traditional assumptions of a monopoly of professional wisdom
placed in jeopardy, have to “compete” with these agents on what
must be conceptualized as a complex, uncertain and turbulent
landscape if their advice is still to be perceived as sound19. Room
included a discussion of a population group at risk of social
exclusion and poverty in this scenario, applying findings from
research on lone mothers by Millar and Ridge (Ridge, 2007;
Millar and Ridge, 2009). Households which are at risk of losing
some welfare support through benefit reforms are, Room says,
“re-weaving the bricolage of their resources and relationships,
in an effort to resist exclusionary pressures” (Room, 2011,
p. 258). The householder, as “agile institutional entrepreneur,”
actively reworks “the complex web of formal and informal social
affiliations,” including any given employment openings, in which
they are enmeshed (Room, 2011, p. 257). The parts played by
family, friends and neighbors come into the mix, and if a job is
available the question becomes whether or not taking the job is
likely to dovetail adequately with the children’s childcare needs.
At the same time, social institutions and the professionals
associated with them can be expected to adapt to the terrain with
which they are newly confronted. The risks associated with their
decisions may create turbulence, with unequal costs falling on
the least agile households. Powerful groups, sometimes including
professionals, may intervene, “to ensure as far as possible that
their interests are protected, their position consolidated and the
costs of uncertainty displaced onto others,” and thus “occupying
the future” (Room, 2016, p. 194). Implicit gender assumptions
about individual members of families and how their incomes
and expenditures in fact contribute to family as opposed to
individual life may need to be confronted, especially in times
of crisis (Walby, 2015—the previous Section made a relevant
link to Spencer is this regard). There is in fact a considerable
and highly relevant research literature on informal care and the
interface between family members who are informal carers on the
one hand and professionals and policy-makers who devise their
community care support on the other20.
The discussion here suggests that a logical continuum appears
to have been neglected which in a significant manner connects
the operation of Spencer’s mechanism of change in social life,
the adaptation to circumstances by social individuals through
spontaneous cooperation, with the recent work on “agile” agency,
adaptive walks, the negotiating of complex landscapes and
19Faced with such complexity Champy has advocated the merits of the “technique”
of exercising “practical wisdom” by professionals, rather than the mechanical use
of protocols and rules (Champy, 2012, 2018).
20The roots of this body of research go back to the 1970s (Offer, 2006). The
Client Speaks by Mayer and Timms (1970) is a classic text. When in the 1970s
Robinson wrote in In Worlds Apart: Professionals and Their Clients in Welfare
State that a major factor in “troubles” in “professionals-client relationships is the
encapsulation of each in sharply differing subjective worlds” (Robinson, 1978, p.
2) he was reporting the general findings of the times. As mentioned earlier the
topic (as “beneficence”) was discussed by Spencer. An example of recent relevant
research in Europe is (Broese van Groenou and De Boer, 2016).
reaching “successful” outcomes21. In the interests of both the
history of social theory and the reflexive development of the
recent theorizing in relation to professionals, policy-makers and
service-users, Spencer’s mechanism and his own applications
of it to interpreting professional and social life, and apparent
resemblances between them and the more recent investigations,
suggest an affinity which merits more sustained enquiry and
acknowledgment in the future.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This article began by reviewing some recent reinterpretations
of the sociological work of Spencer which have substantially
helped to retrieve his reputation by clarifying its central ideas,
emphasizing his own interpretation of the social organism
and idea of the social self-consciousness of individuals. The
narrative explained the overall structure and theoretical cohesion
of Spencer’s sociological thought, and then how he came to
apply it to professionals and work in general. Spencer stressed
that through their specialization, privileged “acquaintance with
the nature of things” and skill, and “cunning,” professionals
introduced more flexibility, more cooperation, and more space
for innovation into social life.
It then covered Spencer’s more detailed understanding
of “professional institutions” in his Principles of Sociology,
complemented by material from other sources. Although helpful
insights were noted from Dingwall and King (1995) their view
that Spencer was an uncritical supporter of laissez-faire was
challenged as against the evidence. His distinctive concern
with relationships between the state and professions, a liberal
interpretation of equal freedom or “justice” and his argument
for the administration of civil justice to the citizen to be free
of cost were discussed; and also the theme of self-interest and
professional life, itself a lifelong preoccupation for Spencer. The
established church might be losing power, but there was an
aspiring establishment order, the “priesthood” of medical men,
about to win additional powers from governments and a new
bureaucracy to implement them22. Aspects of the wider world
of employment and work in Spencer’s sociology were raised,
including the injustices represented by unreasonable working
conditions, just criticisms made by trade unions, the significance
of the role of women in unpaid domestic care and the costs to
them, and the prospect for professional life in a future, post-
industrial form of society.
The discussion of Spencer and relationships between
professionals and users suggested how accounts of Spencer’s
ecological approach to the evolution of the professions can be
updated. A key part of Spencer’s mechanism of change in social
21Room points out that it is not sufficient to say “that a particular invention
is “complex”, merely in having a number of interrelated components in a
“complicated jumble”: what matters are the non-linear dynamics to which such
connections can lead” (2016, p. 143). The first paragraph of the section in
this discussion, “Professional Institutions” in Spencer’s “Principles of Sociology,”
including Note 12, shows how Spencer seems to meet this criterion.
22His late essay “Sanitation in theory and practice” accused “the sanitary class,”
emerging “since Chadwick’s day,” of exaggerating “the evils to be dealt with while
tacitly exalting its own members” (Spencer, 1901, p. 156).
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life was the adaptation to circumstances by social individuals,
and that mechanism resonates really quite deeply with some
important recent work relating to professionals, policy-makers
and service-users, which focuses on the theoretical and practical
significance of skills associated with ideas of “agile” agency and
negotiating complex “landscapes,” and reaching “successful”
outcomes23.
To end it will be helpful to highlight just two of the substantial
range of themes of conceptual and theoretical significance in
particular that occupied Spencer which have special resonance
in making sense of professional activity and everyday social life
today. The first theme is that of the centrality of the adaptability
to circumstances in Spencer. He becomes a potential catalyst
to lead us into fresh questions about the nature of the relevant
changes in the “social self-consciousness” of citizens about the
state of other citizens (perhaps involving changes in the balance
of power), in times when shifting events and nuances are altering
experiences as agents-as-users (with their expectations) and of
professionals/policy-makers (with their expectations) when they
are interacting reflexively in complex situations. The other theme,
often overlooked in discussions of Spencer, is the need for
freedom to access readily the administration of justice24. The
redress of injustice is itself a potential source of wellbeing which
23It is important to note a further dimension here, pertinent to the passing on of
acquired characteristics, particularly of potential relevance to professions in the
area of health and social care. Meloni and Müller have concluded that “together
with a growing number of social scientists, humanities scholars and life scientists,
we propose that epigenetic research and, particularly, work on such a sensitive
topic as transgenerational epigenetic inheritance needs interdisciplinary exchange
and collaboration to thrive responsibly” (Meloni and Müller, 2018, p. 8).
seems sometimes to be underrated within social and public
policy studies. It also matters because this freedom is still an
overlooked but central theme of the normative side of Spencer’s
analysis of social life, in general outside the scope of the
present study.
Spencer had displayed an intuitive grasp of the first theme
in his writings on evolution in general and on sociology and
psychology in particular a century and quarter ago, and the
second was a radical coda. Taken together and with the other
points discussed they were the key concerns arising from his
work on professionals and professional institutions. Spencer on
professions and service users deserves a better fate than oblivion
on these kinds of matters. But as Spencer himself observed,
“fashion is an accompaniment of the industrial type (of society)
as distinguished from the militant” (Spencer, 1891, p. 209).
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